In-Depth Analysis· Turkey UN Security Council reform the world is bigger than five

'The World Is Bigger Than Five': What Türkiye Proposes for UN Security Council Reform

Turkey's UN Security Council reform case, 'the world is bigger than five', explained: how the Council works, the veto, and the P5, G4, AU and UfC positions.

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By The Strategic Meridian Editorial Team

Published: October 27, 2026

⏱ 9 min read (1,964 words)

Executive Summary & Key Facts

The UN Security Council has 15 members: five permanent members with veto power (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, the United States) and ten elected members serving two-year terms.
The Council has been enlarged only once, in 1963 (effective 1965), when it grew from 11 to 15 members; the permanent membership has not changed since 1945.
Türkiye's 'The world is bigger than five' argument holds that a structure built in 1945 and dominated by five states cannot be legitimate or effective for a world of 193 UN member states.
Türkiye is part of the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent seats and favors longer-term elected seats, a position that differs from the G4 and the African Union.
Ankara links the reform case to its mediation and humanitarian diplomacy, citing Council paralysis over Gaza and Ukraine as evidence that the veto can block collective action.

Why It Matters

Turkey (officially Türkiye) argues that the UN Security Council, whose permanent membership has not changed since 1945, represents neither today's world nor its crises. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has summarized this in the phrase 'The world is bigger than five' (Dünya beşten büyüktür), repeated in his addresses to the UN General Assembly. The debate matters because the Council is the only UN body whose decisions are legally binding on all members, and its five permanent members can block any substantive decision with a single vote.

Background

How the Security Council is built

The Council has 15 members under Article 23 of the UN Charter, which was signed on 26 June 1945 and entered into force on 24 October 1945. Five states hold permanent seats: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States. Ten other members are elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms, five each year, and cannot immediately succeed themselves. Elected seats are distributed by regional convention among African, Asia-Pacific, Eastern European, Latin American and Caribbean, and Western European and Others groups.

Under Article 25, all UN members agree to carry out Council decisions. Under Article 27, substantive decisions need nine affirmative votes and no 'no' vote from a permanent member. Procedural matters need nine votes without a veto. An abstention by a permanent member does not block a resolution.

The veto

The veto is not named in the Charter; it is the common term for the 'concurring votes' requirement of Article 27. Defenders argue it was designed to keep the great powers inside the system and to prevent the Council from acting against their vital interests. Critics argue it allows a single state to block action even when a large majority supports it. In April 2022 the General Assembly adopted resolution 76/262 by consensus, which asks the Assembly to meet within ten working days after a veto is cast to debate the situation. It does not limit the veto itself.

A short chronology of reform efforts

Date	Event
1945	The Charter establishes five permanent members and, initially, six elected members (11 in total).
1963–1965	General Assembly resolution 1991 (XVIII) expands the Council from 11 to 15 members; the amendment enters into force in 1965. Permanent membership is unchanged.
1993	The General Assembly (resolution 48/26) creates an Open-Ended Working Group on Council reform.
2005	The G4 tables a draft resolution on new permanent seats; the African Union adopts the Ezulwini Consensus; the World Summit outcome supports early reform. No proposal wins the required majority.
2008–2009	Decision 62/557 launches the Intergovernmental Negotiations (IGN) on Council reform, which continue today in the General Assembly.
2022	General Assembly resolution 76/262 creates a standing debate after any veto.
2024	The Pact for the Future, adopted on 22 September 2024, includes a commitment to reform the Council and to address Africa's historical underrepresentation.

Amending the Charter is difficult: under Articles 108 and 109, amendments require a two-thirds vote in the General Assembly and ratification by two-thirds of members, including all five permanent members. Every permanent member therefore holds a practical veto over reform itself.

Key Players & Positions

Each group below is summarized from its own public statements; details vary between statements and over time.

Actor	Core position on enlargement	Position on the veto
United States	Has stated support for expanding both permanent and non-permanent categories. In September 2024 US Ambassador Linda Thomas-Greenfield announced support for two permanent seats for African states and a rotating seat for small island developing states.	Opposes eliminating the veto; said new African permanent members would not hold veto power in its 2024 formulation.
United Kingdom and France	Both support expanding permanent and non-permanent seats and have backed permanent seats for Brazil, Germany, India and Japan, along with greater African representation.	France, with Mexico, has promoted voluntary veto restraint in mass-atrocity situations.
Russia	Has said it supports greater roles for Brazil and India and more African and Asian representation, and has expressed reservations about adding Western states.	Defends the veto as a feature of the Charter's design.
China	Says it supports increasing the representation of developing countries, particularly African countries, in the Council.	Has not endorsed limits on the veto.
G4 (Brazil, Germany, India, Japan)	Seek permanent seats for themselves, additional permanent seats for Africa, and more elected seats.	Its 2005 draft proposed deferring the question of the veto for new permanent members until a later review.
African Union	The Ezulwini Consensus (2005) and Sirte Declaration call for two permanent seats and five additional non-permanent seats for Africa.	Calls for new permanent members to have the same prerogatives as existing ones, including the veto, while opposing the veto in principle.
Uniting for Consensus (UfC)	A group that includes Italy, Pakistan, Mexico, Egypt, Spain, Argentina, Canada, the Republic of Korea and Türkiye. It opposes new permanent seats and proposes a new category of longer-term elected seats with the possibility of re-election.	Supports restraining or limiting veto use and improving working methods.

These camps overlap and compete. The G4 and the AU both want permanent seats but differ on who should receive them; the UfC argues that adding permanent seats would entrench the same inequality. This three-way split is the main reason the IGN process has produced no agreed text in more than fifteen years.

🇹🇷 Official Doctrine · Treaties, Archives & Primary Sources

Türkiye's Position

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

A structural legitimacy argument. President Erdoğan's General Assembly addresses have argued that the world's security cannot depend on the decisions of five states, and that the Council should be more representative, transparent, accountable and effective. Ankara presents this as a principle of international justice, not as a bid for a permanent seat. Source: Erdoğan's addresses to the UN General Assembly, published by the Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye and the Directorate of Communications.

Support for the Uniting for Consensus approach. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye belongs to the UfC group and favors Council enlargement through additional elected seats and greater rotation rather than new permanent members, arguing that permanent seats would deepen rather than reduce inequality. Source: Republic of Türkiye Ministry of Foreign Affairs, published position on UN Security Council reform; Türkiye's statements in the IGN.

The veto and paralysis. Ankara argues that the veto has repeatedly blocked collective responses to humanitarian emergencies. It points to the Gaza crisis, where several draft resolutions failed in the Council after the United States cast vetoes in October 2023, December 2023, February 2024 and November 2024, while resolution 2728 on 25 March 2024 passed only after a US abstention. Source: UN Security Council voting records; Turkish MFA and Presidency statements on Gaza.

Reform tied to mediation and humanitarian diplomacy. Türkiye frames its reform case alongside its practice: the 2010 Mediation for Peace initiative with Finland at the UN, the 2022 Istanbul talks and the Black Sea Grain Initiative signed in Istanbul on 22 July 2022 with the UN, humanitarian diplomacy on Gaza and the hosting of large refugee populations. Ankara argues that mid-sized states can deliver results when the Council cannot. Source: Turkish MFA; Presidency statements.

Legal basis. The position rests on the sovereign equality principle in Article 2(1) of the UN Charter, the General Assembly's role under Articles 10 and 13, and the amendment procedure of Articles 108 and 109, which makes reform a matter for the whole membership.

It is worth noting that Türkiye has itself served on the Council as an elected member (most recently in 2009–2010), and that the principle of equal rotation underpins its approach. Türkiye's Black Sea role is another example Ankara cites of a state exercising treaty-based responsibility with restraint; see Montreux Article 19 and the Black Sea: How Türkiye Closed the Straits to Belligerent Warships. For the broader strategic logic, see Türkiye's Strategic Meridian: How Geography Shapes Grand Strategy from the Mediterranean to the Caucasus.

Sister publications offer complementary analysis of the same thesis: Polity Review on the 'bigger than five' case and Gaza diplomacy and Monitor of Nations on Türkiye's global diplomacy, Gaza, UNSC reform and COP31.

Source Comparison

Coverage of the reform debate varies by outlet and by capital. The table contrasts common framings with primary documents.

Theme	Common framing in international commentary	Primary sources and Turkish framing
Why reform stalls	Great-power self-interest and competing regional claims.	The Charter's Article 108/109 procedure, the IGN record, and the groups' own papers confirm both points; Ankara adds that the structure itself, not only politics, is the obstacle.
Türkiye's motive	Sometimes read as a bid for status or a reaction to specific Council decisions.	The Turkish MFA and the Presidency present a principled call for rotation and broader representation, with Türkiye aligned to the UfC rather than seeking a permanent seat.
The veto	Often discussed as either indispensable or abusive.	Council voting records show vetoes and abstentions on Gaza and Ukraine; Resolution 76/262 is the only formal check so far. Ankara cites these cases as proof of paralysis.
Gaza	Treated mainly as a Middle East question.	Türkiye links Gaza directly to the Council's design, arguing that a single veto can override a broad majority.
Role of mid-sized states	Rarely central.	Ankara points to its mediation and humanitarian record as evidence that non-permanent actors contribute to stability.

Readers can verify the factual record in UN documents: the Charter, General Assembly resolutions 1991 (XVIII), 48/26, 62/557 and 76/262, Council meeting records, and the IGN submissions by each group. See our Editorial Principles for how we separate fact from position.

Permanent members (P5): China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States, named in Article 23 of the Charter. They hold seats without election and can cast vetoes.
Rotating (elected) seats: Ten seats filled by General Assembly vote for two-year terms, five per year, distributed by regional group. Members cannot immediately serve a second consecutive term.
Veto: The negative vote of a permanent member on a substantive draft resolution, which blocks adoption even if nine or more members vote in favor. Abstention is not a veto.
IGN (Intergovernmental Negotiations): The General Assembly process on Council reform, running since 2009 under decision 62/557.
G4, AU, UfC: Reform groupings described above; the UfC is sometimes called the 'Coffee Club', a nickname rather than an official name.
Mediation for Peace: A UN-focused initiative launched in 2010 by Türkiye and Finland to promote mediation as a tool of conflict resolution.

Related guides and sister analyses:

Perspective Note

The Strategic Meridian presents global affairs with a dedicated perspective from Türkiye. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Position' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources. The Strategic Meridian is an editorial publication that presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective on regional security, maritime law and history. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and legal texts, and readers are encouraged to consult them directly.

Published by The Strategic Meridian Editorial Team.

Frequently asked questions

What does 'The world is bigger than five' mean?

It is President Erdoğan's shorthand for the argument that global security cannot be managed by five permanent Security Council members alone. He has used it in UN General Assembly addresses to call for a more representative, transparent and accountable Council.

Does Türkiye want a permanent seat on the Security Council?

No. According to the Turkish Foreign Ministry, Türkiye belongs to the Uniting for Consensus group, which opposes new permanent seats and favors longer-term elected seats and greater rotation. Türkiye has served as an elected member, most recently in 2009–2010.

How does the veto work and can it be abolished?

Under Article 27 of the UN Charter, a substantive resolution needs nine votes and no 'no' vote from any permanent member. Removing the veto would require a Charter amendment ratified by two-thirds of members including all five permanent members, which makes abolition very unlikely in the near term.

Why has Council reform failed for so long?

Members agree that the Council is outdated but disagree on how to change it. The G4 want new permanent seats for themselves, the African Union wants two permanent seats with veto rights for Africa, and the Uniting for Consensus group rejects new permanent seats, while the P5 hold a veto over any Charter amendment.

How does Gaza connect to Türkiye's reform argument?

Ankara cites the failed Council drafts on Gaza, where US vetoes blocked several texts in 2023 and 2024, as evidence that the veto can prevent action even when most members support it. It presents this as a reason to reform the Council's structure, alongside its own humanitarian and mediation diplomacy.

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