What Is the Terror-Free Türkiye Initiative? Security, Law and Politics After Four Decades of PKK Violence

By The Strategic Meridian Editorial Team

Why It Matters

The Terror-Free Türkiye (Terörsüz Türkiye) initiative is Türkiye's attempt to end, through a combined security, legal, political and social strategy, the armed campaign the PKK has waged since 1984. It matters because the PKK announced its own dissolution in May 2025, the most significant development in a conflict that has cost tens of thousands of lives and shaped Turkish domestic politics, Iraq's north and Syria's northeast. Its outcome will also affect regional security, the Syria file and Türkiye's relations with the EU and the United States.

The process is ongoing and its legal details are still being worked out. This guide separates documented facts from official positions and from critics' assessments.

Background

Four decades of PKK violence

The PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) was founded in 1978 around Abdullah Öcalan. It launched its armed insurgency on 15 August 1984 with attacks in Eruh and Şemdinli in southeastern Türkiye. It is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States (since 1997), the European Union (since 2002) and NATO. Estimates of total deaths since 1984, including civilians, security personnel and militants, commonly exceed 40,000, according to figures cited by Turkish officials and by independent research groups. Methodologies differ, so treat any single number with caution.

Öcalan was captured in Kenya in February 1999, brought to Türkiye and sentenced. He has been held on İmralı Island since. In Öcalan v. Türkiye (No. 2) (2014), the European Court of Human Rights found that his aggravated life sentence without a prospect of release violated Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The ruling remains a reference point in debates over his legal status.

Earlier attempts

Türkiye has attempted political tracks before. These included the 2009 'democratic opening', contacts in Oslo in 2009–2011, and the 'Resolution Process' (Çözüm Süreci) of 2013–2015. That process collapsed in July 2015 after the Suruç bombing and the killing of two police officers in Ceylanpınar. Violence then resumed. Ankara's later cross-border operations are covered in From Euphrates Shield to Spring Shield.

Timeline of the current process

Date	Development
22 Oct 2024	MHP leader Devlet Bahçeli, in parliament, suggests Öcalan could address the TBMM if he declared terrorism over and the PKK dissolved. President Erdoğan signals support.
Dec 2024	Delegations of the DEM Party begin visits to Öcalan on İmralı.
27 Feb 2025	A 'Call for Peace and a Democratic Society' attributed to Öcalan is read out, urging the PKK to hold a congress and dissolve.
1 Mar 2025	The PKK announces a ceasefire.
12 May 2025	The PKK announces its dissolution and the end of armed struggle after its congress.
11 Jul 2025	A group of PKK members burns weapons in a ceremony in northern Iraq.
5 Aug 2025	The TBMM's National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission holds its first meeting.
26 Oct 2025	The PKK announces the withdrawal of its fighters from Turkish territory.

The specific sequence of later steps, including legal measures, should be checked against current official sources.

Key Players & Positions

• Presidency, AK Party and MHP (the governing alliance). Ankara presents the initiative as a state policy to end terrorism permanently and says it proceeds within the constitution. The Directorate of Communications and the Presidency have described the PKK's May 2025 decision as an important step.
• DEM Party. The pro-Kurdish party acted as an intermediary with Öcalan. It calls for a legal framework for the return and reintegration of members, democratic reforms and improved conditions for Öcalan, often referred to as the 'right to hope' (umut hakkı).
• CHP (main opposition). The CHP took part in the parliamentary commission and has said it supports ending violence. Its leaders have stressed that the process must be transparent, centred on parliament, and accompanied by democratic standards. They have also linked the credibility of the process to judicial proceedings against opposition figures. The government rejects political motivation in those cases.
• Nationalist opponents. The İYİ Party declined to join the commission and has criticized the process. Its argument is that the state should not negotiate with an organization responsible for decades of violence. Other parties on the nationalist right have voiced similar concerns.
• PKK leadership. The organization announced its ceasefire, dissolution and withdrawal, but has framed these steps as part of a political process and called for legal guarantees.
• European Union. EU officials have welcomed the announcements as a potential opportunity for peace. The European Parliament and the European Commission continue to call, in their annual Türkiye reports, for rule-of-law, judicial independence and fundamental-rights reforms. They consider these relevant to the process's durability.
• United States and Iraq. Washington and Baghdad, along with the Kurdistan Regional Government, have welcomed steps toward disarmament. For Iraq, the PKK's presence in the north is a sovereignty issue.
• Syria's government and the SDF. The 10 March 2025 agreement between the Syrian interim authorities and the SDF on integrating the SDF into state institutions is directly linked to Ankara's expectations. Implementation has been contested and fluid, so consult current reporting.

Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine

This section reflects official Turkish policy (Türkiye's Position) as stated by Turkish government sources, and each point is attributed to them.

• A four-track state policy led by the Presidency. According to statements from the Presidency and the Directorate of Communications, Terror-Free Türkiye combines security measures, legal arrangements, political dialogue through parliament, and social measures such as reintegration and reconciliation. Ankara's stated goal is a permanent end to terrorism, not a tactical pause.
• Rule-of-law framing. Ankara argues the process is conducted under the constitution, including Article 3, which defines the state as an indivisible entity, and through the TBMM, whose commission is chaired by the Speaker. Officials say it does not rely on foreign mediation and does not alter the state's unitary structure. The official position is that all citizens already hold equal rights on the basis of citizenship, an approach rooted in the Lausanne settlement of 1923 and the Republic's constitutional order.
• Counter-terrorism at the source. The Ministry of National Defence has repeatedly said that Türkiye's operations rest on the right of self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter and will continue until the terrorist threat is removed. Ankara argues that sustained security pressure created the conditions for the PKK's decision, and that any disarmament must be verified. See also Regions & Powers on Article 51 and Terror-Free Türkiye.
• Link to Syria policy: 'one state, one army'. Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan and other officials have said the PKK's dissolution must extend to all its affiliates, which Ankara considers to include PYD/YPG, the core of the SDF. Türkiye supports Syria's territorial integrity and the principle of 'one state, one army', meaning that armed groups should be integrated into, or disarmed within, the Syrian state's institutions. Ankara links this to the security of its 1,300 km southern border.
• Continuing the fight against all terrorist groups. Türkiye says the initiative does not weaken its struggle against DAESH (ISIS) or FETÖ, the network behind the 15 July 2016 coup attempt. The PKK is designated a terrorist organization by Türkiye, the United States, NATO and the European Union; see WorldPoliticsDaily on the PKK designation.

For how this security approach fits Ankara's broader geography-driven strategy, see Türkiye's Strategic Meridian and Polity Review on the security doctrine and defence industry.

Source Comparison

Turkish official sources and international commentary agree that the PKK's decision is significant. They differ on what drove it, what it should lead to and what could derail it.

Question	Turkish official sources	International media, opposition and analysts
What is the process?	A state policy to end terrorism within the constitution and parliament (Presidency, Directorate of Communications).	Often described as a peace or negotiation process. Analysts disagree on whether it is a negotiation, a state-managed disarmament or both.
Why now?	Security pressure and the regional context created a 'historic window'.	Analysts point to the PKK's weakened position, regional shifts after the fall of the Assad government in December 2024 and domestic political calculations, including constitutional debates.
Öcalan's role	The call for dissolution is treated as influential; his legal status is a matter for law and the judiciary.	DEM and some European voices ask for improved conditions or a legal path, citing ECtHR case law.
Legal framework	To be developed through parliament and the commission.	Opposition and observers question whether transparency, reintegration rules and judicial independence are sufficient.
Syria	The dissolution should cover affiliates; 'one state, one army'.	SDF leaders and some Western actors stress the SDF's role in fighting DAESH and distinguish Syrian Kurdish actors from the PKK. Ankara rejects this distinction.
Risks	Spoilers and unverified disarmament.	Mistrust after 2015, domestic polarization, and developments in Syria and Iraq.

For the site's sourcing standards, see Editorial Principles. A parallel treatment appears in Hard Power Review's explainer.

Key Terms & Related Guides

• Terör​siz Türkiye (Terror-Free Türkiye): the official name of the initiative to end PKK terrorism through security, legal, political and social tracks.
• PKK/KCK: the PKK and its umbrella organization, the Kurdistan Communities Union.
• PYD/YPG and SDF: the Syrian branch of the PKK/KCK in Ankara's assessment, and the broader force it leads. Some Western governments distinguish them from the PKK.
• DEM Party: the pro-Kurdish party that has facilitated contact with Öcalan.
• 'One state, one army': the principle that armed groups in Syria should be integrated into state institutions.
• Article 51, UN Charter: the inherent right of self-defence invoked for cross-border operations.

Related reading: From Euphrates Shield to Spring Shield, Türkiye's grand strategy and the meridian, About The Strategic Meridian and Editorial Principles.

Perspective Note

The Strategic Meridian is an editorial publication that presents analysis from a Türkiye-informed perspective on regional security, maritime law and history. Claims are attributed to primary sources such as treaties, UN documents, official archives and legal texts, and readers are encouraged to consult them directly. Sections marked 'Türkiye's Strategic Doctrine' reflect official Turkish policy as stated by Turkish government sources.